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1. INTRODUCTION 
1. In an increasingly consumer-oriented, globalised and digital economy, a single 
market that responds efficiently to consumer demands also helps to deliver an 
innovative and competitive economy. Encouraging active participation of citizens in 
the good functioning of markets helps protect healthy competitive conditions. In 
particular, access to redress by consumers when consumer rights are violated by 
traders promotes consumer confidence in the markets and improves their 
performance. 
2. The Commission Consumer Policy Strategy1 fixes the objective of promoting the 
retail internal market by making consumers and retailers as confident shopping cross-
border as in their home countries by 2013. This objective, however, can only be 
achieved if consumers know that if they have a problem, their rights will be enforced 
and they will receive adequate redress. 76% of the consumers who have low 
confidence in cross-border purchasing feel that it is very or fairly important for their 
confidence to be able to bring a cross-border case to their national courts under their 
national law2. This points to a lack of trust in other legal systems, both regarding 
substantive rights and the means of satisfactory redress. The proposal for a Directive 
on Consumer Rights3 will address the issue of legal certainty on substantive rights. 
However, the efficacy of cross-border redress needs to be addressed independently. 
3. In its Strategy, the Commission underlined the importance of effective redress 
mechanisms for consumers and announced its intention to consider action on 
consumer collective redress. The European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee welcomed the Commission's intention to improve 
consumer redress and in particular to consider action on collective redress4. The 
OECD in its recommendation on consumer dispute resolution and redress5 
encouraged its member countries to provide consumers with access to different 
means of redress, including collective redress mechanisms. 
                                                 
1 COM (2007) 99 final 
2 Flash Eurobarometer (EB) 57.2 – Spring 2002 
3 COM (2008) 614 final 
4 In their resolutions on the Consumer Policy Strategy, the EP asked the Commission, after careful 
assessment of the issue of consumer redress in the Member States "…to present, as appropriate, a 
coherent solution at European level, providing all consumers with access to collective redress 
mechanisms for the settlement of cross-border complaints" (A6-0155/2008); the Council invited the 
Commission "…to carefully consider collective redress mechanisms and come forward with the results 
of on going relevant studies, in view of any possible proposal or action", OJ C 166, 20.7.2007, p.1-3. 
The EP request was re-iterated in the resolution on the Green Paper on retail financial services (A6-
0187/2008). The EP committee of inquiry on Equitable Life also had requested the Commission "… to 
investigate further the possibility of setting up a legal framework with uniform civil procedural 
requirements for European cross border collective actions…" (A6-0203/2007). The EESC in its own-
initiative opinion of 14 February 2008 INT-348 – CESE 258/2008 put forward proposals in respect of 
the legal arrangements for CR mechanisms 
5 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf 
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4. The purpose of this Green Paper is to assess the current state of redress mechanisms, 
in particular in cases where many consumers are likely to be affected by the same 
legal infringement, and to provide options to close any gaps to effective redress 
identified in such cases. As economic market integration at retail level increasingly 
leads to consumers participating in retail markets beyond their borders and therefore 
being affected by the same practices as national shoppers, it is not found useful to 
make a distinction between cross-border mechanisms for mass claims and purely 
national mechanisms. Another issue arising is whether instruments possibly to be 
chosen would apply only to cross-border or also to national cases. 
5. The present Green Paper does not address collective redress for victims of EC 
antitrust law infringements because of the specific nature of antitrust law and the 
wider scope of victims which includes also SMEs. In this regard, the Commission 
has suggested, in its White Paper6, a set of specific measures to ensure that 
consumers as well as businesses across the EU Member States can obtain effective 
compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of infringements of EC antitrust 
law. These measures include two collective redress mechanisms that are tailored to 
overcome the particular difficulties encountered by victims of antitrust 
infringements, i.e. an opt-in collective action for several victims who expressly 
decide to combine their individual claims in a single action and a representative 
action, which can be brought by qualified entities such as consumer organisations or 
state bodies on behalf of a group of victims.  
2. OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM  
6. As mass consumer markets expand in size and even become cross-border, very large 
numbers of consumers can be harmed by the same or a similar practice of a trader. 
The effect of a malpractice may be so widespread as to distort markets. For example, 
UK banks are under investigation for having systematically imposed excessive 
charges on several hundred thousand consumers whose accounts became 
overdrawn7. An EC led enforcement action across the European Union revealed 
widespread abuse in the market for ring tones8: around 60% of websites checked had 
the obligatory pre-contractual information, but hid it or presented it in small print. 
Advertisements claimed to offer "free" ringtones but acceptance of the offer resulted 
in payment and sometimes even a subscription.  
7. Because infringements of consumer rights that affect a very large number of 
individuals may create distortions in markets, the Green Paper focuses on the 
resolution of mass claim cases and aims at providing effective means of collective 
redress for citizens across the EU. This means mechanisms by which a large group of 
consumers affected by a single trader's practice can effectively obtain redress 
wherever the trader is located within the EU.  
                                                 
6 White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html 
7 http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/market-studies/current/personal/personal-
test-case 
8 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1169&format=HTML& 
aged=0&language=EN 
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8. Currently, when consumers affected by a malpractice want to pursue a case, they 
face barriers9 in terms of access, effectiveness and affordability. This is particularly 
true for claims that involve small amounts. The sectors in which consumers find it 
most difficult to obtain redress for mass claims are financial services (39% of 
documented cases), telecommunication (12%), transport (8%) as well as package 
travel and tourism (7%)10. These are sectors where consumers are increasingly likely 
to engage in cross-border activities. 
9. Consumers can always go to court to obtain individual redress. Mass claims could 
then in principle be resolved with a large number of individual claims. But there are 
barriers which de facto impede European consumers from obtaining effective 
redress. These are in particular high litigation costs and complex and lengthy 
procedures. One out of five European consumers will not go to court for less than 
EUR 1000. Half say they will not go to court for less than EUR 200.11 High costs 
and the risk of litigation make it uneconomic for a consumer to pay court, lawyer 
and experts fees that may exceed the compensation. Procedures are so complex and 
lengthy that consumers may find themselves entangled without any clear perception 
of when (or if) their case will be satisfactorily resolved. Only 30% of consumers 
think that it is easy to solve disputes through courts12.  
10. In some instances, but not all, consumers can have access to individual alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms. The state of these mechanisms across the EU is 
fragmented. Access to it varies across Member States and even within Member 
States it may vary by sector, being for instance available only for specific sectors. 
Only 39% of European consumers believe that resolving disputes with traders 
through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is easy13. 
11. Consumers also lack awareness of the different types of enforcement and redress 
tools that are available, particularly if they go cross-border, either physically or via e-
commerce. There also seems to be a lack of faith in current systems that discourages 
complaints and therefore prevents consumers from obtaining redress. 51% of 
consumers who complained to a trader and were not satisfied with the way their 
complaint was dealt with, did not take further action.14 A study by the UK Office of 
Fair Trading on consumer detriment shows that only 62% of consumers harmed 
complain on average in the UK and this percentage drops to 54% for purchases less 
than GBP 1015. When asked what problems they might encounter when shopping 
cross-border, consumers rated highest the difficulties of resolving problems (33%)16.  
12. Thirteen Member States currently have judicial collective redress mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are very different across countries and have diverse results. The study 
                                                 
9 Cf. Study regarding the problems faced by consumers in obtaining redress for infringements of 
consumer protection legislation, and the economic consequences of such problems (Problem Study), 
p.42, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm 
10 Problem Study, p.21 
11 Special EB on Access to Justice, October 2004, p.29; these figures concern only EU-15 
12 EB survey on Consumer Protection in the Internal Market, September 2008 
13 However, the situation is different from one country to another. The Netherlands is the country with the 
highest percentage of consumers confident in ADR (57%), followed by Nordic countries (Denmark and 
Finland 47%, and Sweden 45%). On the other hand, Bulgaria has the lowest figure (12%), together with 
Slovakia (17%) and Portugal (19%). See footnote 12 
14 See footnote 12 
15 See http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/consumer-protection/ 
16 See footnote 12 
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launched by the Commission17 and the consultations conducted18 show that the vast 
majority of the existing collective redress mechanisms tend to have some elements 
that work, and some that do not. Almost all existing collective redress mechanisms 
have some added value compared to individual judicial redress and alternative 
dispute resolution schemes19. But their efficiency and effectiveness could be 
improved. The mechanisms have been applied in relatively few cases.20 The lowest 
number of consumers using a collective redress mechanism is in Germany where on 
average only four in ten million people every year have participated in a collective 
redress action.21 The collective redress mechanism that reached the most people in a 
single case is that of Portugal where a case against a telecommunication company 
gave redress to some 3 million consumers affected by the same overcharging. The 
compensation to these consumers was largely in kind and non-monetary. The 
average benefit to consumers in collective redress mechanisms have ranged from 
EUR 32 in Portugal to EUR 332 in Spain.22 
13. Elements which contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of a collective redress 
mechanism include political and financial support from governments, high media 
coverage (which can act as an incentive for traders to settle and can also help in 
finding financing companies; in general it can have a deterrent effect on 
wrongdoers), no or low litigation fees for consumers, no or reduced litigation fees for 
representatives, flexible solutions regarding lawyers' fees and bypassing the 
formalities of normal civil procedures.  
14. On the other hand, elements which hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
collective redress mechanism include insufficient funding, lack of expertise and 
resources of consumer organisations, the fact that the risk of paying high litigation 
fees often falls on consumer organisations, the complexity of collective redress 
mechanisms, very strict prerequisites regarding admissibility and standing (which 
deter from access to the mechanisms), the length of proceedings and the ability of 
defendants to delay proceedings, lack of media coverage, the inability to distribute 
the proceeds of the actions effectively, the dependence of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms on the trader's willingness to cooperate and the use of one 
collective redress mechanism for all claims, without tailoring the mechanism to the 
value, needs and specificities of each particular claim.  
15. As a consequence of the weaknesses of the current redress and enforcement 
framework in the EU, a significant proportion of consumers who have suffered 
damage do not obtain redress. In mass claim cases that affect a very large number of 
                                                 
17 Study on the Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of CR mechanisms in the European Union 
(Evaluation Study), p.47 and part II (country reports); 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm 
18 The Commission organised a workshop in Leuven in June 2007 and it held three more workshops with 
consumers, business stakeholders and legal practitioners in May-June 2008. At the Portuguese 
Presidency Conference on CR in Lisbon in November 2007, a consultation on draft benchmarks for an 
effective and efficient CR system was launched, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm 
19 Evaluation Study, p.93 
20 326 cases were documented. A number of mechanisms (the Bulgarian, Danish and Finnish group 
actions and the Greek test case procedure) were introduced too recently to be properly evaluated. The 
Italian mechanism is under revision  
21 Evaluation Study, p.116 
22 Evaluation Study, p.116. These figures exclude the results for the Netherlands which are distorted by a 
few cases which involve large companies and significant amounts  
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consumers, although sometimes the harm may be low for the individual consumer, it 
can be high for the size of the market. As these markets become more cross-border in 
nature, effective cross-border access to the mechanisms of redress become necessary. 
Today, close to 10% of collective redress claims have a cross-border element23. For 
example, a UK company recently distributed scratch cards in Irish newspapers 
offering "free" holidays, whereas in reality this offer cost each consumer a minimum 
of EUR 13024. With further integration of the markets this percentage is likely to rise. 
3. EXISTING EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS 
16. Some instruments specifically designed for consumer redress already exist at 
European level. There are two Commission Recommendations25 to facilitate 
alternative dispute resolution through simple and inexpensive procedures. Both 
recommendations set out principles for the good functioning of out of court 
settlements. The Injunctions Directive26 provides a procedure enabling consumer 
associations and public authorities to stop infringements abroad. Public enforcement 
was recently strengthened through the Regulation on Consumer Protection 
Cooperation27 which allows named national authorities to request another Member 
State authority to act on an infringement. Neither the Injunction Directive nor the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation provide for consumer compensation. 
17. The overall performance of the existing consumer redress and enforcement tools 
designed at EU level is not satisfactory. The Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Regulation is relatively new but indicates that public cross-border enforcement is not 
yet satisfactory. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are not available to 
consumers in all Member States or in all sectors. For example, in nearly no Member 
State there is an alternative dispute resolution schemes in the airline transport sector. 
Only two cross-border cases have been brought since the Injunctions Directive 
entered into force in 199828, the main reasons being the financial risk for the entity 
bringing the case as well as the complexity and diversity of national injunctive 
proceedings.  
18. Since there is evidence that commercial malpractice affecting multiple consumers 
often goes unsolved and since, where it exists, collective redress can potentially 
provide a useful complementary means of reducing consumer detriment, the present 
Green Paper focuses on collective redress as a tool that could help solve the 
problems that consumers face in obtaining redress for mass claims both in national 
and cross-border contexts. 76% of consumers would be more willing to defend their 
                                                 
23 Evaluation Study, p.44 
24 Problem Study, Annex 3 
25 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for the 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, OJ L 115, 17.04.1998, p. 31 and Commission 
Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual 
resolution of consumer ADR, OJ L 109, 19.04.2001, p.56 
26 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for 
the protection of consumers' interests, OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 51 
27 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p.1 
28 Report from the Commission concerning the application of the Injunctions Directive, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/injunctions_en.htm 
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rights in court if they could join together with other consumers29. Businesses would 
avoid losses through unfair competition, gain more legal certainty and reduce some 
of their litigation costs by being able to bundle the claims against them30. At the 
same time, the necessary safeguards have to be taken not to burden business with 
unmeritorious claims, punitive damages, or excessive costs. 
4. OPTIONS 
19. The current consumer redress situation in the EU is unsatisfactory and is not 
allowing large numbers of consumers affected by a single breach of the law to obtain 
redress and compensation. The Commission has identified a number of options 
which could be used to address this issue, which is important for the protection of 
healthy and integrated retail markets within the EU. The goal is to have effective 
mechanisms that work for both consumers and traders. The options below are 
presented according to an increasing degree of EU involvement. These options as 
well as different elements within the options could also be combined.  
Option 1 – No EC action 
20. This option involves no new EC action and relies on the existing national and EC 
measures to achieve adequate redress for consumers. National judicial redress 
schemes, either individual or collective, coupled with alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and complaint-handling systems set up by traders/services providers, 
provide redress for consumers with mass claims. The extent to which this redress is 
effective varies, depending on the different systems in place. 
21. At EU level, legal instruments capable of helping to resolve cross-border mass 
claims will either have to be implemented in the near future or come into effect 
shortly. The Mediation Directive31 must be implemented by 2011, and the 
Commission will report on its application in 2016. The European Small Claims 
Regulation32 will apply from 1 January 2009, and the Commission will report on its 
application in 2014. However, both instruments have limited application to mass 
claims. The Mediation Directive can only help in cases where the parties are willing 
to mediate. The Small Claims Regulation concerns cross-border disputes not 
exceeding EUR 2.000 and whether it applies to collective redress will depend on 
national procedural rules. These rules may allow, for example, the possibility of 
grouping together several individual claims against the same trader, each not 
exceeding the threshold envisaged by the Regulation. It may be desirable to await the 
assessment of the impact of these EU measures on mass claims.  
22. Option 1 would mean waiting until more information33 is available on the effect of 
the national and EU measures in place or about to be implemented. It has the 
                                                 
29 This figure even presents a slight increase compared with the previous EB in 2006 (74%). See footnote 
12 
30 Problem Study, p.96 
31 Directive 2008/52/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects 
of mediation in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, p.3 
32 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p.1 
33 In order to gather evidence about the functioning of the different redress systems, the Consumer 
Markets Scoreboard will be used to present data collected on redress issues 
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advantage of not imposing any additional implementation costs for Member States or 
businesses. It has the disadvantage of leaving different means of redress available to 
consumers, depending on their place of residence or on the Member State where the 
transaction took place or the damage occurred. This fragmented situation could lead 
to distortions of competition and give consumers across the EU a different level of 
redress. This option would possibly not provide satisfactory redress to a number of 
consumers concerned or remedy obstacles to the Single Market.  
Option 2 – Cooperation between Member States 
23. This option involves developing cooperation between the Member States in order to 
ensure that consumers throughout the EU are able to use the collective redress 
mechanisms that are available in different Member States. This option would ensure 
that Member States having a collective redress mechanism open up their respective 
mechanisms to consumers from other Member States and that Member States who do 
not have a collective redress mechanism establish one. This could be achieved 
through either a Recommendation or a Directive. In parallel, a Recommendation 
could lay down a set of benchmarks which all Member States systems should satisfy.  
24. Thirteen Member States currently have some form of collective redress 
(representative action, group action, test case mechanism). These actions can be 
brought by consumer organisations, individuals or public bodies. For example, if a 
trader in a Member State having a representative action committed an infringement 
of consumer protection legislation, the Member State concerned should ensure that 
the competent national entity also represents consumers from other Member States, 
or should allow entities from other Member States to bring a representative action 
before its courts. In the case of a group action, the relevant Member State should 
allow consumers from other Member States to join actions brought by its own 
consumers or should allow consumers from other Member States to initiate actions 
before its courts. Finally, a Member State with a test case should allow consumers 
from other Member States to bring a test case before its courts, and ensure that the 
effect of any test case is extended to all consumers affected, regardless of their 
nationality or residence. 
25. The opening up of national collective redress mechanisms could be facilitated by 
establishing a cooperation network bringing together the entities that have the power 
to bring a collective redress action in those Member States having such mechanisms, 
including public bodies and consumer organisations.  
26. For representative actions, the cooperation could involve the competent entities in 
the trader's Member State either bringing a representative action on behalf of 
consumers located in other Member States upon request of their counterpart entities 
in these Member States, or assisting these counterpart entities to take direct action. 
For group actions and test cases, members of the network in the Member State 
concerned could co-operate in assisting harmed consumers to bring or join group 
actions or test cases before the courts in the Member State of the trader. 
27. Assistance provided could include launching information campaigns about pending 
collective redress actions, gathering claims, assisting with the translation of 
documents, explaining national judicial proceedings and helping to find national 
legal practitioners and experts.  
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28. Member States with collective redress mechanisms might be hesitant to grant 
resources to their entities for bringing collective redress actions on behalf of or 
assisting consumers from other Member States before their courts when entities in 
Member States without collective redress mechanisms do not have such an 
obligation. Informal consultations with consumer organisations in such Member 
States seem to indicate that they would not be willing to develop such activities due 
to a lack of resources. An equitable mechanism for bearing the costs of proceedings 
would need to be introduced. Member States could also be encouraged to provide 
sufficient resources to their entities for this purpose. 
29. The work of the cooperation network could be facilitated by the European Consumer 
Centres Network (ECC-Net). The advantage of using the ECC-Net is that it is an EU-
wide network which is already in place. However, since it currently works mainly on 
individual cross-border out-of-court actions, different expertise and more resources 
would be needed34.  
30. Alternatively, a new specific collective redress network could be created. The 
funding necessary for such a network would depend on its workload which would in 
turn depend on the number of entities belonging to the network, their competence 
and expertise, the exact tasks assigned to them and the number of cross-border cases 
that would arise.  
31. Issues relating to jurisdiction and the law applicable to contractual and non-
contractual obligations (see paragraphs 58-60), would also arise under this option. 
Option 3: Mix of policy instruments 
32. Option 3 envisages a mix of policy tools, non-binding or binding, that can together 
enhance consumer redress by addressing the main barriers identified earlier, namely 
high litigation costs, complexity and length of proceedings, consumers' lack of 
information on the available means of redress. It involves: improving alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, extension of the scope of national small claims 
procedures to mass claims, extending the scope of the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Regulation, encouraging businesses to improve their complaint handling 
schemes and taking actions to raise consumers' awareness of existing means of 
redress. 
33. When consumers decide whether to take action or not, the value of a claim is an 
important parameter. Consumers are not likely to act when their claim is below a 
certain threshold. Alternative dispute resolution schemes, small claims procedures 
and cooperation between national public enforcement authorities may be more 
efficient for different levels of claim value. 
34. When both parties have sufficient incentives35 to go to alternative dispute resolution 
schemes, this tool has proved an efficient alternative to court proceedings in low and 
medium value cases, as it may be quicker, less expensive and more flexible. 
Alternative dispute resolution schemes may be less suitable for high value claims, 
which often involve complex facts and evidence gathering. For very low value 
                                                 
34 This may lead to possible additional costs to be decided in agreement with the Member States  
35 For instance media attention or the availability of effective judicial redress 
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claims consumers are unlikely to seek redress since the individual loss is lower than 
the cost of litigation. 
35. Small claims procedures are simplified court procedures with low litigation costs and 
relatively quick handling. For these reasons they are a good tool for individual low 
and medium value claims, when the parties refuse to negotiate. 
36. Action by national public enforcement authorities such as those of the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation network could provide efficient redress in cases where 
alternative dispute resolution schemes and small claims procedures are less likely to 
work, particularly in very low value cases where consumers have little incentive to 
take action. 
37. Existing consumer alternative dispute resolution schemes vary considerably within 
and between Member States. They can be publicly or privately funded, be hosted by 
public or private organisations, by collegiate or individual bodies, have a nationwide, 
regional or local coverage, be responsible for all consumer claims or only for claims 
in a specific-sector, take binding or non-binding decisions or lead to agreements 
between the parties. There are also significant gaps in alternative dispute resolution 
coverage, both sector-specific and geographical. Not all consumer claims can 
therefore be dealt with through alternative dispute resolution schemes. Most 
alternative dispute resolution schemes within the EU deal principally with individual 
claims. Some Member States have amended36 or may adapt37 their legislation to 
expressly recognise collective alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
38. The existing EU framework does not exclude collective alternative dispute resolution 
schemes. Although the two Recommendations on alternative dispute resolution were 
not drafted with the resolution of collective consumer claims in mind, their principles 
can also be applied to collective alternative dispute resolution schemes. The 
Recommendations could be supplemented to respond to specific issues linked to the 
management of collective claims.  
39. The EU could encourage Member States to establish collective consumer alternative 
dispute resolution schemes making sure that such schemes are available on their 
entire territory for all consumer claims and accessible to consumers from other 
Member States. Member States could have the choice on how to establish collective 
alternative dispute resolution schemes. They could either adjust their existing 
schemes or establish one or more new alternative dispute resolution schemes to deal 
with consumer collective claims. The existing European networks such as the ECC-
Net or FIN-Net which already help individual consumers to access an alternative 
dispute resolution in another country could also help consumers with similar claims 
to access the appropriate collective alternative dispute resolution schemes in another 
Member State. This may lead to possible extra operational costs for these networks. 
Any additional costs would need to be decided in agreement with Member States 
which co-finance the ECC-Net. 
40. This could be achieved by a Recommendation or Directive. A Recommendation with 
a result-oriented monitoring process would offer flexibility in its implementation and 
could be designed as a first step. An EU Directive could also require Member States 
to set up collective consumer alternative dispute resolution schemes. Either of such 
                                                 
36 Sweden, Finland 
37 Slovenia 
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instruments could be more detailed and present the main components of a collective 
alternative dispute resolution scheme (e.g. the composition of the scheme and the 
procedure). 
41. In parallel, the Commission could bring stakeholders together to develop a standard 
model for collective alternative dispute resolution scheme which is easy to use, in 
particular in a cross-border situation. This standard model could present the main 
components of a collective alternative dispute resolution scheme. Such a model 
could be used by stakeholders who want to set up a collective alternative dispute 
resolution scheme. It would be a voluntary step towards achieving convergence of 
collective alternative dispute resolution schemes. 
42. Another measure that could help improve existing redress mechanisms is for 
Member States to extend the scope of their small claims procedures, so as to deal 
efficiently also with mass claims in a national and cross-border context. For example, 
when several individuals have the same claim against the same trader for the same 
damage, all these claims could be grouped together, ideally by the court, and dealt 
with by the simplified procedures envisaged for individual small claims. A 
Recommendation with a monitoring process could be the appropriate instrument.  
43. The Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation sets up an EU-wide network of 
national public enforcement authorities. These authorities can call on other members 
of the network for assistance in investigating possible breaches of consumer laws and 
in taking action against traders who have committed such breaches. The Consumer 
Protection Cooperation Regulation sets out a non-exhaustive set of investigation and 
enforcement powers necessary for its application which can be exercised only where 
there is a reasonable suspicion of an intra-Community infringement, and include a 
power to require the cessation or prohibition of any intra-Community infringement.  
44. The Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation could be amended to include a 
power whereby a competent authority, after the finding of an intra-Community 
infringement, could require the trader to compensate consumers that have been 
harmed38. The detailed working of such a mechanism would be left to Member 
States. They would deal with issues such as funding, how and by which entity 
affected consumers would be found and informed, what type of evidence the 
consumers would need to provide, measures to be taken if the trader does not comply 
with the order to compensate, and possibilities for appeal. Alternatively, such issues 
could also be dealt with at EU level via a Recommendation or a Directive. On 
funding, Article 4(7) of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation stipulates 
that "Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have adequate resources 
necessary for the application of this Regulation." 
45. The scope of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation would need to 
include under "intra-Community infringements" acts that harm the individual 
interests of multiple consumers in addition to acts that harm the collective interest of 
consumers. A threshold of the number of consumers involved would need to be set. 
The compensation resulting from the decision of a court or public authority would 
have to be properly distributed to consumers from other Member States. Especially 
                                                 
38 The Commission has informally consulted the CPC network, and it seems that in the vast majority of 
Member States, public enforcement authorities do not have the power to order traders who have 
committed an intra-Community infringement to compensate consumers, while only in a few Member 
States do they have the right to sue wrongdoers for damages on behalf of consumers 
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regarding very low value claims, the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation 
could provide for a power to skim-off the profit from traders who have committed an 
intra-Community infringement. This would imply that Member States would have to 
grant their public authorities this power39. Details would be left up to the Member 
States. For instance, Member States would decide if the amount skimmed-off would 
go to the State treasury or to consumer-related purposes. The scope of the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation Regulation would remain unchanged. Under such a system 
individual consumers would not be able to obtain a share of the skimmed-off profit. 
Consumers would benefit indirectly from the deterrent effect that such a system 
would have on traders. 
46. Businesses have an interest in ensuring that their customers are content. Self-
regulatory measures, could be encouraged where they do not yet exist. Existing 
measures could be further improved. This involves for example ensuring that all 
businesses have an internal complaint-handling system which is credible, works 
efficiently and is subject to independent monitoring or auditing standards. The 
Commission could encourage all businesses, particularly in those sectors where more 
mass problems are reported, to develop self-regulatory measures in the form of a 
code and to make this widely known to consumers.  
47. In order to increase consumers' knowledge of their means of redress, awareness-
raising actions could be envisaged. These could be in the form of EU or national 
information activities, either in general or tailored to specific sectors. Possible 
actions could range from information events carried out by consumer organisations 
to actions promoted by Member States or the EU. 
Option 4 – Judicial collective redress procedure  
48. This option proposes a non-binding or binding EU measure to ensure that a collective 
redress judicial mechanism exists in all Member States. Such a procedure would 
ensure that every consumer throughout the EU would be able to obtain adequate 
redress in mass cases through representative actions, group actions or test cases. The 
issues to be decided include the financing of the procedure, how to prevent 
unmeritorious claims, standing in court, the question of an opt-in or opt-out 
procedure and the distribution of compensation. The purpose of this option is to 
provide a judicial collective redress procedure that is effective and efficient in 
providing redress for consumers. In any case, this option should avoid elements 
which are said to encourage a litigation culture such as is said to exist in some non-
European countries, such as punitive damages, contingency fees and other elements. 
49. On the issue of financing, the costs may prevent consumers from engaging in a 
collective action and make it very hard for consumer organisations to handle mass 
cases in representative actions.  
50. One - partial - solution could focus on cutting down the costs e.g. by exempting 
collective actions from court fees or capping legal fees.  
51. With regard to representative actions, the financing of entities representing 
consumers is crucial. One could consider allocating a share of the compensation to 
                                                 
39 The Commission has informally consulted the CPC network, and it seems that such a power does not 
exist in the majority of Member States  
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the organisation to cover its costs. A third party (e.g. banks) or a public body could 
grant a loan to cover possibly needed pre-financing of court proceedings. Litigation 
funding by private third parties (e.g. companies specialising in financing litigation) is 
practised successfully in some Member States. Another solution could be public 
funding by the Member States. Different funding solutions could also be combined. 
52. A EU mechanism should facilitate meritorious claims and benefit consumers. At the 
same time, it needs to discourage a litigation industry as mentioned before, as this 
would benefit lawyers rather than consumers and create high costs for defendants. In 
order to avoid the possibility of abuse of a collective redress mechanism, various 
elements qualify as safeguards and help to prevent unmeritorious claims. The 
judge can play an important role by deciding whether a collective claim is 
unmeritorious or admissible. Certification of the representative entity acts as a 
gatekeeper, as does the loser-pays-principle in the Member States where it exists. 
Public authorities could be potential gatekeepers when funding collective redress, 
refusing to allocate resources to unmeritorious claims.  
53. The consumers' position in collective redress court procedures could be reinforced by 
giving legal standing to pursue a representative action to qualified entities such as 
consumer organisations or ombudsmen.  
54. An important element of collective redress procedures is the decision of whether an 
opt-in or opt-out procedure should be introduced.  
55. Opt-in systems could be burdensome and cost-intensive for consumer organisations 
which have to do preparatory work such as identifying consumers, establishing the 
facts of each case, as well as running the case and communicating with each plaintiff. 
They also may face difficulties in obtaining a sufficiently high number of consumers 
opting-in in the case of very low value damage, where consumers are less likely to 
act. However, they do not involve the risk of promoting excessive or unmeritorious 
claims. 
56. Opt-out solutions might mitigate some of the difficulties of the opt-in systems. 
However, they are often viewed negatively in Europe due to the perceived risk of 
encouraging the excessive litigation experienced in some non-European jurisdictions. 
Any collective redress system should be designed to avoid such a risk. In any case, 
the issue of information dissemination across borders remains relevant. Lack of 
information could lead to a situation where consumers would be bound by a 
judgement without their knowledge or without having been able to contest the 
management of the case. In addition, in opt-out scenarios consumer organisations 
may face a burden when they have to identify the victims and distribute the 
compensation. 
57. In an opt-in procedure the said problems could be solved by the court distributing 
the compensation and by allowing consumers to join a mass action after the 
judgement in a test case has been delivered and giving the judgement effect for all 
victims. Each consumer would, however, have to follow a specific judicial procedure 
in order to benefit from the judgement.  
58. In cross-border cases the Regulation on jurisdiction40 would be applicable to any 
action including an action brought to court by a public authority, if it is exercising 
                                                 
40 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, OJ L12, 16.1.2001, p.1 
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private rights (e.g. an ombudsman suing for consumers). Representative actions 
would have to be brought to the trader's court or the court of the place of 
performance of the contract (Art. 5 (1)).  
59. In mass cases where consumers come from different Member States, the court would 
have to apply to contractual obligations the different national laws of the various 
consumers (Art. 6 Rome I Regulation41). This would cause practical problems in 
cases with consumers from many different Member States. A solution would be to 
introduce an amendment to the rules imposing the law of the trader in collective 
redress cases. Other options are the application of the law of the market most 
affected or of the Member State where the representative entity is established.  
60. In similar situations in the area of product liability (Art. 5 Rome II Regulation42) a 
choice of law agreement after the damaging event occurred (Art. 14 (1a) Rome II 
Regulation) would help.  
Q1: What are your views on the role of the EU in relation to consumer collective 
redress? 
Q2: Which of the four options set out above do you prefer? Is there an option 
which you would reject?  
Q3: Are there specific elements of the options with which you agree/disagree?  
Q4: Are there other elements which should form part of your preferred option? 
Q5: In case you prefer a combination of options, which options would you want 
to combine and what would be its features? 
Q6: In the case of options 2, 3 or 4, would you see a need for binding 
instruments or would you prefer non-binding instruments? 
Q7: Do you consider that there could be other means of addressing the 
problem?  
With this Green Paper the European Commission calls on the interested persons to 
express their views by sending in their replies (marked “Response to the Green Paper 
on Consumer Collective Redress”) no later than 1st March 2009 to: 
European Commission 
Directorate-General Health and Consumers 
                                                 
41 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L177, 4.7.2008, p.6 
42 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p.40 
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Rue de la Loi 200 
1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
Or by e-mail to Sanco-consumer-collective-redress@ec.europa.eu 
Contributions will be published on the website of the Health and Consumers 
Directorate-General of the European Commission. It is possible to request that 
submissions remain confidential. In this case, contributors should expressly state on 
the first page of their submission that they oppose publication. The Commission will 
examine the contributions and publish a summary thereof in the first half of 2009. 
On the basis of the outcome of the consultation, the Commission will present another 
policy paper in 2009. 
Privacy statement 
Purpose and scope of personal data processing: 
Health and Consumers Directorate-General will record and further process your 
personal details to the extent that they are necessary for the follow-up of your 
contribution to the public consultation on the Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress. 
Your data will be handled in conformity with Regulation (EC) N° 45/2001 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data.  
Your data are recorded and stored as long as follow-up actions are needed in the 
context of your contribution. 
For transparency purposes, the contributions, including your name and position in 
your organisation will be communicated to the public, in particular through the 
Health and Consumers web pages on Europa at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm 
Right of rectification & personal data controller: 
Should you require further information concerning the processing of your personal 
data or exercise your rights (e.g. access or rectify any inaccurate or incomplete data) 
please contact:  
Sanco-consumer-collective-redress@ec.europa.eu 
You have the right of recourse at any time to the European Data Protection 
Supervisor at edps@edps.europa.eu 
